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Abstract 
Since the late 1990s, a good numbers of emerging-market countries have adopted inflation targeting (IT) as a 
monetary policy framework. The hallmarks of this approach are an explicit commitment by the central bank to 
keep an inflation index close to a Periodically-adjusted target, and the use of an inflation forecast as the 
intermediate target for policy. In view of this, the study examined how likely inflation targeting will respond to 
monetary policy in Nigeria. To achieve the objective we used time series data that span from 1985 to 2015 on 
inflation, exchange rate, prime lending rate, Income (GDP) and money supply to estimate an Autoregressive 
Distributed Lag Model of inflation. The finding shows that monetary variables are good explanatory variables in 
explaining the changes in inflation on Nigerian economy and also the first and second lagged of Money supply 
exert a very high significant influence on the growth of inflation in Nigeria. We recommend the consideration of 
effective management of money supply, interest rate and exchange rate to ensure stability as a precondition for 
the achievement of inflation targeting. 
Keywords: Inflation targeting, economic stability, monetary policy, Nigeria 
 
Introduction 
The beginning of 1990 witnessed increasing numbers of countries adopting inflation target as one of the 
parameters of achieving monetary policy that encourages economic growth and stability. This policy has 
encouraged drastic reduction and maintenance of single digit inflation rate in the countries that have adopted 
inflation targeting. Inflation-forecast targeting, as a systematic decision procedure for the conduct of monetary 
policy, was developed at the Reserve Bank of New Zealand in 1990. It has increasingly become popular 
framework among other Central Banks. For example, many central banks in Europe and Canada have all adopted 
inflation targeting as work in progress, with little idea from existing literature on monetary policy rules.  
One of the major challenges facing economic experts all over the globe is to find out the right monetary policy 
instrument that can rejig the economy in order to meet their country’s sustainable national development goals.  
Monetary Policy is one of the corner-stones in economic policy formulation and implementation in Nigeria. 
It is a major stabilization weapon which involves a package of measures or actions taken by the monetary 
authorities to regulate and control the volume, cost and other terms under which money and credit are supplied to 
the economy in order to achieve a set of specified macroeconomic objectives (Soludo, 2003). Over the years, 
monetary policy in Nigeria has been designed to achieve certain policy objectives which includes reduction of 
inflation and unemployment rates, strengthening an economy’s external balance of payment position,  stabilizing 
the economy’s exchange rate and enhancing overall national growth among others.  
The issue concerning inflation targeting is anchored on the roles of monetary policy in any country is to 
achieve and preserve a single digit inflation rate that is stable over a long period of time. Nevertheless,there has 
been a divergent views among  economic policy experts, it is generally accepted as a result of the consensus  on 
the basic assumption; that a surge in the money supply has on serious impact  in the medium to long run. In other 
words, more money supply has a positive correlation with price level and not on output or employment. Unstable 
and high inflation is detrimental to the economy in terms of either in the distribution of scarce resources or 
increase in output in the long run, or both. Money plays a pivotal role in the short run in the economy. As a result 
of this, monetary policy plays an essential role on the performance of key variables, such as output and 
unemployment. The impact of monetary policy on inflation occurs with varying degrees of lags of uncertain 
duration and strength. These fluctuations encumber the Central Bank to control inflation on a period-by period 
basis. Based on the above logically principles, a very good  number of  policy makers analysts and economists 
have argued in favour of inflation targeting as a framework that can redesign the implementation and 
performance of monetary policy compared with the Central Banks’ usual procedures, which is usually shrouded 
in secrecy and lacked openness.  
The ultimate goals of monetary policy, according to Sanusi (2002), has been the achievement of price 
stability,  stable exchange rate regime that results in a balance of payments position that is favourable and 
sustainable, and recording high GDP growth rate. Over time, monetary policy has been derived from budget 
variables that is money supply, GDP growth and inflation rate. For example, in 1999 the target growth in M2 
was 10.0% while that of M1 was 4.1%. Meanwhile, inflation was expected to be at a single digit. The deviations 
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from the targets reveal that M2 and M1 actually grew by 31.4% and 19.9% respectively. Inflation grew by over 
10.5%, while GDP grew by 2.0% against the targeted 3.0%. The implications of setting budget variables is that it 
raises households expectation about the variables in future, thereby making it impossible to track down price 
changes.  
An x-ray of the Nigerian economy shows that between 1970 and 1975, inflation rate stood on average of 
14.28% and 12.70% in 1981, 15.27% in 1997, 28.57% in 1993, 30.7% and 12.41% in 1999 and 2005 
respectively (CBN, 2006). This is a startling revelation of the fact that inflation has stood on average of 18.99% 
in the past 36 years, while broad supply growth maintained an average of 19.0% within the period. Interestingly, 
this scenario implies that inflation growth rate was at par with broad money supply, and this simply suggest that 
Money supply targeting is rather unreliable means of controlling inflation in view of instabilities in the demand 
for money. Hence, the effectiveness of monetary policy target in taming inflation in Nigeria remains an 
empirical issue.  
This research, therefore, raises the following questions (1) How effective is inflation targeting monetary 
policy framework in Nigeria? (2) What magnitudes of inflation arise as a response to monetary policy in Nigeria? 
(3) What is the length of duration it takes for inflation to respond to monetary policy instruments in Nigeria? 
Inflation targeting has emerged in recent years as the leading framework within which monetary policy is 
conducted around the world. The success of inflation targeting monetary policies in established market 
economies have generated an interest among policy makers in some emerging market economies to explore the 
feasibility of adopting the same in order to overcome the recent inflationary trends. The rationale for adopting 
inflation targeting as a monetary policy instrument is because of the tendency of policy summersault that is 
usually associated with the change of guard in political sub sector of the economy in a situation where the 
autonomy of the central bank is not guaranteed. The contention here is that the economic sub-sector is being 
controlled by the political sub-sector.  Therefore, to protect this policy instrument, diligent efforts should be 
made to spell out the rules and the major policy thrust should be well thought out. Though there is every 
tendency to mistrust policymakers as a result of veering off the rule, and pursuing wrong targets could very well 
push the economy to a different path that is not in 
consonance with the country’s development goals. Hence the relevance of the study is implicitly derived 
from the fact that the empirical findings will provide useful information to the Policy makers in Nigeria 
especially the monetary authority (CBN) when designing appropriate monetary policy framework for controlling 
inflation. The outcome of the study will identify the importance monetary variables required to serve as the 
operational instrument to meet the inflation target in Nigeria. Finally, it will contribute to existing debates among 
academics on the relevance and effectiveness of the inflation targeting monetary policy. 
 
2.1 Literature Review 
Many scholars have argued in favour of inflation targeting as a veritable monetary policy instrument.Those in 
this category include Leiderman and Svensson, (1995), Corbo et al., (2001, 2002); Clifton et al., (2001); Arestis 
et al., (2002); Johnson (2002, 2003); Scott andStone,(2005); 
Mishkin (2006) conducted studies in industrialized countries, and recommend that inflation targeting matters and 
very relevance in an economy in reducing inflation to a minimum level. 
Mishkin and Hebbel (2006), inflation targeting provides a clear path for the medium-term inflation outlook, 
reducing the size of inflationary shocks and their associated costs. Since long-term interest rates fluctuate with 
movements in inflation expectations, targeting a low rate of inflation would lead to more stable and lower long-
term rates of interest. He argued that concentrating only on numerical inflation objectives may affect negatively 
the flexibility of monetary policy which may have consequences on other policy goals. Therefore, inflation 
targets should give room for flexibility, and should be adjusted for volatile components. 
On the same vein, Heintz and Ndikumena (2011) suggest an alternative approaches to monetary policy and 
instrumental constraints that would need to be addressed to allow Central Banks to play a stronger 
developmental roles in sub-Saharan African countries. They argued that fiscal responsibility and financial 
discipline are conditions for Inflation Targeting to achieve its aim. 
Mboweni (2008) added that inflation targeting is beneficial because of its ability to adjust monetary policy 
to shocks with minimal real output loss while still anchoring inflation expectations. One way of thinking about 
inflation targeting is that it provides a set of rules for adjusting monetary policy to shocks. 
Bjorn and Carl (2017) argued that when inflation targeting was introduced in Sweden and other countries at 
the beginning of the 1990s, it followed a period when high and varying inflation had been a major problem .It 
was important to establish credibility for the new policy and quickly build confidence in the inflation target. The 
focus of monetary policy was therefore on inflation. But with time, as confidence in the inflation target grew, 
monetary policy could take more account of the real economy. Flexible Inflation Targeting was introduced as a 
generic term to describe a monetary policy where the central bank aims at stabilizing both inflation and the real 
economy. Of course, even a central bank that only aims to stabilize inflation has to take the real economy into 
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account, since developments in the product and labour markets will affect the outlook for inflation. But with 
flexible inflation targeting, stabilizing the real economy is a goal of its own. 
Mishkin (2000) on the contrary contended that inflation targeting may not be appropriate for many 
emerging countries because of weak Central Bank accountability which is a serious problem that results from 
long lags from monetary policy instruments to the inflation outcome and also because financial instability caused 
by flexible exchange rate. 
Palley (2002) was of the opinion that inflation targeting is an insufficient framework for monetary policy in 
the presence of financial exuberance. According to him, current theoretical rationalizations of inflation targeting 
are flawed, being unable to explain why Central Banks should aim for “low” inflation. 
Again, Stone (2003) lists the condition necessary for any country that is thinking of adopting inflation 
targeting. First is that the Central Bank should have some level of autonomy. The monetary authorities must be 
allowed to use the instruments of monetary policy toward the stated objectives. The conduct of monetary policy 
should not be dictated or constrained by purely fiscal considerations. This implies that public sector borrowing 
from the Central Bank and the banking system should be low or nonexistent. The government should have a 
broad revenue base and should not rely on the revenues from seigniorage generated by excessive currency 
issuance; domestic financial markets should have enough depth to absorb the placement of public and private 
debt instruments; and the accumulation of public debt should be sustainable and not unduly constrain monetary 
policy. 
The second requirement for adopting inflation targeting is that the authorities should refrain from targeting 
the level or path of any other nominal variable, such as wages or the nominal exchange rate. A country that 
chooses a fixed exchange rate system subordinates its monetary policy to the exchange rate objective, and is not 
effectively able to target directly any other nominal variable, such as the rate of inflation. 
A country that satisfies these two basic requirements could, in principle, pursue its monetary policy that is 
in tandem with inflation targeting policy instrument.To achieve this, the Central Bank is expected to set up a 
monetary policy framework which must have the following important four elements which are: 
(i.)Explicit inflation targets for some period or periods ahead 
(ii) Clear and unambiguous indications that attaining those inflation targets is the overriding objective of 
monetary policy 
(iii) A model for forecasting inflation that uses relevant variables and information indicators 
(iv) And a forward-looking operating procedure in which the setting of policy instruments depends on assessing 
inflationary pressures and where inflation forecasts are used as the main intermediate target of monetary policy. 
In similar vein, Packard (2005) posits that countries adopting inflation targeting must fulfill certain 
conditions before adopting inflation targeting. He argues that it is imperative that the Central Bank should not be 
constrained to finance the government budget and must have an effective monetary policy instrument like the 
short-term interest rate that is fully market determined. Moreover, transparency and accountability of the Central 
Bank is essential to anchor inflationary expectations. 
Tatliger  (2017) posits that there is no solid inflation theory in economics, however, mainstream economics 
places great emphasis on combating inflation. This is rather evident in most of the macroeconomics textbooks 
such that inflation is regarded as one of the most fundamental concepts while income distribution concept is 
relegated to the sidelines. For example, inflation is portrayed as one of the three major concerns of 
macroeconomics, alongside output growth and unemployment, while income distribution cannot make into that 
list in the tenth edition of the Principle of Macroeconomics. 
Inflation and output performance in economies using the inflation-targeting framework (ITF) has been good 
by historical standards, and both governments and Central Banks claim to be pleased with the framework. 
Advocates and practitioners of the ITF have been leaders in shaping and exploiting the new consensus that 
Central Bank transparency can make policy more effective. 
Kontolemis (1998), however, states that the problem with inflation targeting is that of the lags in policy 
transmission as well as the uncertainties of forecasting. Monitoring the Central Bank’s policy is difficult.  
Coats (2000), on the conduct of monetary policy, argues that with a monetary rule, inflation targeting must 
be guided and disciplined by a model (though potentially a more complex one than simple money demands 
equation) that forecasts the price level consequences of current policy instrument settings. The stance of 
monetary policy must be motivated by achieving the inflation target and must be perceived by the public as 
likely to succeed in that objective. 
Bernanke (2003) provided evidence that suggests that Central Banks that have switched to inflation 
targeting have generally been pleased with the results they have obtained. The strongest evidence on that score is 
that thus far, at least, none of the several dozen countries (New Zealand, Canada, the United Kingdom and 
Germany) that adopted inflation targeting has abandoned the approach. Ball and Sheridan (2005) showed that 
inflation targeting does not make a difference in industrialized countries; rather, the apparent success of 
inflation-targeting countries simply reflects regression toward the mean. However, these findings were heavily 
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disputed by Hyvonen (2004), Vega and Winkelried (2005), and IMF (2005), who presented evidence generated 
with different specifications and estimation techniques and based on samples that include emerging economies 
that inflation levels, persistence, and volatility are lower in inflation-targeting countries. These studies concluded 
that output volatility has not worsened after the adoption of inflation targeting; if anything, it has improved. 
Calderón and Schmidt- Hebbel, (2003); Albagli and Schmidt-Hebbel, (2004); and Gosselin, (2006) present 
an evidence which increasingly indicates that inflation targeters are successful in meeting their targets. They 
conclude that a virtuous circle seems to be at work with inflation targeting being adopted in conjunction with 
institutional improvements that help strengthen monetary policy credibility.  
In another dimension, Roger and Stone, (2005), provide result that contended that inflation targets are never 
met exactly; the success and resilience of the regime indicate that no country has dropped inflation targeting to 
date and this is attributed to its flexibility and its improvements in monetary policy formalization and 
transparency. Mishkin and Posen (1997) find that inflation targeting has proved an effective strategy in the fight 
against inflation, especially in maintaining the benefits of registering low inflation levels. These authors base 
their argument on the premise that whenever inflation targeting was adopted, the countries experienced inflation 
rates and interest rates, which were lower than the magnitudes simulated with unrestricted VARs, while no major 
effect is apparent on the output. Inflation targeting may also have an impact on the relationship between current 
inflation and its past history. Using uni-variate time series, Sikklos (1999) finds that the autoregressive 
coefficients show a noticeable drop in the strength of the relevant relationship for countries such as New Zealand, 
Canada, Finland, Sweden and Spain.  
 
2.2 Overview of Monetary Policy Framework in Nigeria 
Historically, monetary policy in Nigeria was mainly short term (NEEDS 2004). However, recently the Central 
Bank has moved to medium-term framework. The overriding objective of monetary policy in Nigeria is price 
and exchange rate stability. The monetary authority’s strategy for inflation management is based on the view that 
inflation is essentially a monetary phenomenon. Owing to the fact that targeting money supply growth is 
considered as an appropriate method of targeting inflation in the Nigerian economy, the Central Bank of Nigeria 
(CBN) chose a monetary targeting policy framework to achieve its objective of price stability.  
The CBN’s focus on the price stability objective was a major departure from past objectives in which the 
emphasis was on the promotion of rapid and sustainable economic growth and employment. Prior to 1986, the 
CBN relied on the use of direct (non-market) monetary instruments such as credit ceilings on the deposit money 
of banks, administered interest and exchange rates, as well as the prescription of cash reserves requirements in 
order to achieve its objective of sustainable growth and employment.  
Notwithstanding, three years ago, the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) Governor, Prof Soludo, announced 
the willingness of the monetary authority to bring inflation rate in Nigeria to a single digit. This is as a result of 
the priority given to inflation reduction through the CBN set objective on monetary policy. This necessitated the 
adoption of inflation targeting monetary policy frame work in March, 2005. The CBN objective by this policy is 
to maintain inflation below 10% over the medium term and a return to a flexible exchange rate regime as a 
strategy to adopting an inflation targeting framework (IMF Nigeria 2005 Article IV Consultation concluding 
statement March 25, 2005).  
 
METHODOLOGY 
3.1The Model 
The study adopts a simple linear specification of the multivariate time series function using the partial 
adjustment approach and Autoregressive Distributed Lag model. 
 
3.2 Model Specification  
INF=F (PLR, EXRT, GDP, MSS)………... (1) 
      Where;           
                   INF = Inflation Level 
                   EXRT =    Exchange Rate 
                   MSS   =   Money Supply 
                   GDP = Gross Domestic Product 
                  PLR = Prime Lending Rate                 
Presenting equation (1) in a linear functional form as follows:   
INF=0+1PLR+2EXRT+3GDP+4MSS+ Ut………. (2) 
Where; 
 0= Constant, 
         1- 4 are the parameters to be estimated 
         Ut = random error term 
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Transforming equation (2) into a log dynamic model is necessary so as to scale down the variables. The choice 
of dynamic model is informed by the fact that it may take lapse of time for inflation to respond to the set of the 
policy variables. That is to say, the response might not be automatic. Equation (2) thus transforms to;  
InINF=0+1InPLRt-i+2InEXRTt-i+3InGDPt-i+4InMSt-i+Ut (3) 
 
3.3 Unit Root Test 
The unit root test of stationarity using Augmented Dickey Fuller (ADF) test was applied because most 
macroeconomic variables are subject to volatility (Granger and Newbold, 1974; Dickey and Fuller, 1981; Enders, 
1995; Pindyck and Rubinfeld, 1998, Gujarati, 2004). Thus, we present the ADF specification of our model as 
follows; 


 
n
i
tttt INFIniINFInINFIn
1
110 )4.......(..............................
 
     Where;  
                   INF = Inflation level (our dependent variable) 
                  = First–difference Operator 
                   Stationarity level 
The negativity of  is expected to be very large in order to make the variable stationary. 
The Speed of adjustment of the monetary policy instrument (Natalucci and Piger, 2004) is given below; 
Median lag of the instrument target: 
log 2
...(6)
log
i
 
 
    
 = the long run multiplier of monetary policy instrument. This shows length of time required for 50% 
change in the inflation emanating from a unit sustained change in monetary policy instrument. For a high speed 
of adjustment we have the mean lag of the instrument target: 
...(7)
1
i
i
 
 
  


 
This is the weighted average of all the lags involved and it shows the speed of adjustment at which inflation 
respond to the monetary policy instrument.  
 
3.4 Data Sources 
The data for this study are secondary data sourced from the Central Bank Nigeria Statistical Bulletin of various 
years. 
 
PRESENTATION AND DISCUSSION OF RESULTS 
4.1 ADF Test for Stationary  
The Augmented Dickey-Fuller unit root test is run on the variables up to their 2nd difference. The result is 
presented in the table below: 
Table A: Unit Roots Test (ADF – Test) 
Variable  T-ADF   Lag Length Order of Integration 1% Crit  val 5% Crit  val 
MS             -6.1087**       1 I(2) -2.637 -1.952 
INF -5.3132**       1 I (1) -2.637 -1.952 
INT            -5.4418**       1 I (1) -2.637 -1.952 
REXR -4.3418**       1 I (1) -2.637 -1.952 
GDP -3.1043**       1 1(2) -2.637 -1.952 
Authors’ computation, 2016 
**significant at both 1 percent and 5 percent critical value 
The table shows that inflation and interest rate have its t-ADF greater than 1% and 5% critical values of -
2.637 and -1.952 respectively suggesting that the variables are stationary at first differencing. They are 
integrated of order 1. On the other hand, Money Supply (MS) and GDP were stationary after second differencing 
implying that they are integrated of order 2.  
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4.3 Co-integration test   
Table B: Co-integration test result 
 t-adf   Lag length 1% critical value 5% critical value 
Residual 0.44396     2 -1.951 -2.632 
Residual -1.5238     1 -1.951 -2.632 
Residual -4.5633**   0 -1.951 -2.632 
The result above shows there is no co-integration between the variables because the residual obtained from 
the linear combination of the non-stationary variables is not stationary at 1% and 5% critical value using ADF 
test. Hence, we estimated Autoregressive Distributed Lag Model. 
 
4.4 Presentation of Dynamic Modeling of Inflation result 
Table C: Result Summary 
Variables Coefficient Std.Error   T-value   T-prob   
CONSTANT          0.010124      0.023349    0.434   0.6682   
DDINF_1         -0.16460       0.041285     0.128   0.4834   
DMSS   0.502885      0.041285     2.128    0.8991   
DMSS_1         0.405414      0.029093    2.561   0.1306   
DLPLR            -0.066560 0.945751 -1.185 0.0389 
DLPLR_1           -0.28389      0.10789     -1.631  0.0141  
DDLGDP          0.0073056      0.019619     0.372   0.7126   
DDLGDP_1         0.087283      0.091437     0.955   0.3486   
DDEXRT 0.030687 0.045006 0.681 0.5019 
DDEXRT_1 0.020576 0.034005 0.521 0.5019 
    Authors’ computation 2016 
 R2 = 0.601919, F-Stat (7, 26) = 4.6064 DW = 2.05,  
 S.E of Regression 77.669 
 
4.5 Interpretation and discussion of findings 
4.5.1 Inflation 
The lag value of Inflation displays a negative coefficient -0.16460. A unit increase in price level in the past year 
will cause present year price level to decrease by 0.16460 units. However, following the  Rule of Thumb, a 
variable is statistically significant if its t-value is greater than 2 in absolute terms at any given % level of 
significant, and it not statistically significant if its t-value is less than 2 in absolute value at any given % level of 
significant (Gujarati, 2004). Consequently, price level in the past year has no significant impact on price level in 
the current year. Thus, we conclude that inflation in the past year one year is not a major determinant of inflation 
in the present year. 
4.5.2 Money Supply  
First and second lag of Money supply exert high significant influence on the growth of inflation in Nigeria. 
Holding all other variables constant, a unit increase in money supply in the current and past one year bring about 
0.502885 and 0.0405414 units’ increase in inflation respectively and the signs conform to a priori expectation. 
The significant of money supply (2.128 and 2.561) at both current year and past one year validate the role money 
supply. 
4.5.3 Prime Lending Rate 
The prime lending rate shows negative and insignificant relationship with money demand in the current and past 
one year. A unit increase in real interest rate in the current year and past one year causes -0.255660 and -0.28389 
units decrease in inflation respectively. The negative signs display by real interest rate meet economic a priori 
expectation, since interest rate is the opportunity costs of holding money, it follows that higher interest rates 
imply higher opportunity cost (price) of holding liquid. If cost of borrowing is high, people will prefer to demand 
less cash and consequently less inflation. 
Also, shocks that emanate from exchange rate may affect domestic interest parity conditions, and hence 
investment demand. Nonetheless prime lending rate is statistically insignificant in influencing inflation in 
Nigeria. 
4.5.4 Gross Domestic Product 
Gross domestic product shows positive relationship with inflation in the current and previous one year. 
Accordingly, a unit increase in gross domestic product causes 0.0073056 and 0.087283 units’ increase in money 
demand in the current and previous one year respectively and they conform to a priori expectation, since increase 
in output is likely to be accomplished by increase in inflation due to increase demand. Notwithstanding, gross 
domestic product is not statistically significant in influencing inflation in Nigeria.  
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4.5.5 Exchange Rate  
The exchange rate shows positive and insignificant relationship with inflation in the current and past one year. A 
unit increase in exchange rate in the current year and past one year causes 0.030687 and 0.020576 units increase 
in inflation respectively and there is conformity to a priori expectation. Exchange rate affects the cost of 
imported intermediate inputs to domestic production, which in turn may affect aggregate supply.  However, 
exchange rate is not significant in influencing inflation in Nigeria.  
 
4.6 Stability test results of Inflation and Money supply 
Graph A: Cusum Test 
 
Graph B: Cusum Squares Test 
 
The stability of Money Supply using CUSUM and CUSUMSQ tests which Brown, et al (1975) developed 
was tested. For stability to hold, it is important that the CUSUM and CUSUM Squares statistics stay within the 
5% critical bound (represented by two straight lines whose equations are detailed in Brown et al.(1975). As we 
can see from the two figures above, neither the Cumulative Sum ( CUSUM )nor Cumulative Sum of Squares 
CUSUMSQ) plots cross the 5% critical lines. It can be deduced that the estimated parameters for the money 
supply are stable in the recent time. A stable MSS demand function exists over the entire sample period in 
Nigeria. These empirical results support the CBN in its choice of money supply as an intermediate target for 
monetary policy.  
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4.7 Summary of Statistical Tests 
The adjusted R2 of the estimated model shows about 60% of the variation in Inflation rate is explained by the 
combined effects of all the explanatory variables while the F–statistics shows that the overall regression is 
significant at both 1% and 5% levels. Also, the equation’s standard error of 0.77669 signifies that in about two–
third of the time the predicted value of inflation rate would be within 77% of the actual value, while given the 
DW value of 2.05 suggests the absence of serial correlation.  
 
4.8 Discussion on findings 
According to the monetarists, inflation is a monetary phenomenon which comes about when the central bank 
increases the money supply in excess of the demand for money. Such increases in money supply can be caused 
by the financing of fiscal deficits or by extending too much credit to the private sector. Monetarists see the short 
term solution to inflation as the implementation of a contractionary or a restrictive monetary policy. According 
to them, restriction in money supply is a sufficient condition for controlling inflation Friedman (1980). 
Having examined the effect of money supply, prime lending rate, gross domestic product and exchange rate 
on inflation rate, we conclude that all the monetary variables are good explanatory variables in explaining the 
changes in inflation on Nigerian economy. Hence the finding lends credence to the submission of ADEBYI, 
(2010) that an important precondition for inflation targeting is the existence of stable and predictable relationship 
between monetary policy instruments and inflation. Even though he further observed that in developing countries, 
the condition is difficult to fulfill due to the use of seigniorage revenues as an important source of financing 
public debts. 
There would be a need for consideration of effective management of interest rate and exchange rate to 
ensure stability when considering inflation targeting.  
 
4.9 Policy Recommendation 
The findings above have some implication for dynamic monetary policy formulations towards achieving 
inflation targeting in Nigeria. Arising from this, we propose the following recommendations for the economy. 
Monetary authorities’ variation of the nominal money supply has important policy implications. The expansion 
in the nominal supply of money would result in higher inflation that is variation in the nominal money supply 
can affect prices positively. Therefore the reliance on liquidity management and other operating variables aimed 
at containing the growth of money and price stability should be encouraged. 
It is well known in Nigeria that fiscal deficit and government borrowing are largely financed by the banking 
system, with serious implications for monetary growth. Hence it is recommended that the conventional elements 
of a typical stabilisation program that reduces both the budget deficit and credit to the government be adopted in 
curtailing inflation. It’s recommended that contractionionary or restrictive monetary policy be adopted since the 
findings adhere to causes of inflation by monetarists. Consequently, we suggest that the monetary authority 
should strive to reduce the quantity of money in circulation in order to maintain a minimal rate of inflation in the 
country. Lastly, maintaining single digit inflation rate has been in the heart of monetary authorities. Achieving 
this will depend on the effective manipulations of other monetary policy instruments other than interest rate. 
The monetary authority need to make more concerted effort towards stabilizing the exchange rate as this 
will in turn lead to a positive impact of EXCHR on the economy. This will boost the country’s export as well as 
reduce import by reducing inflation in the economy. 
It is also obvious from our findings that Nigeria may not achieve macroeconomic stability if the forecast 
point of Inflation is under single digit percent. In other words, more than single digit target percent is essential 
for Nigeria. Monetary policy should be fully and frequently be flexible based on realities on ground. Fiscal 
discipline should be encouraged through appropriate legislative guidelines that will help the monetary policy 
framework to achieve its stated objectives. 
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